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Prospects for Naturalizing Color, or What's
blue and yellow and green all over?
Alistair Isaac
June 2, 2008
Abstract
In [Chu07], Paul Churchland gives an argument for the objective real-
ity of color; the strategy he deploys to make this argument is an instance
of a more general research program, which he calls domain-portrayal se-
mantics. In section 1, I point out some features of color vision which com-
plicate Churchland's conclusion, in particular, the context sensitive and
inferential nature of color perception. In section 2, I examine and defend
the general research program, concluding that it lies at the intersection
of strategies to naturalize representational content. Such a minimally
naturalistic, or operationalist, program involves two components: rst,
a mapping between the target domain of represented structures (colors,
shapes, middle-sized dry goods, whatever) and the target range of repre-
sentational cognitive structures; second, a detailed account of the causal
processes which induce this mapping. I conclude with some conjectures
concerning the future of such an operationalist program, in particular,
that other perceptual domains may exhibit the same context sensitivity
and inferential character as color.
1 Problems for a Metaphysically Robust Account
of Color
I present Churchland's argument in brief, emphasizing the problem he sees as
the crux of the matter and his solution to it. Next, I briey discuss the context
sensitivity and inherently inferential nature of color perception. These consid-
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erations suggest that Churchland's program will not succeed as an argument for
realism about color.
1.1 Churchland's argument for the objective reality of
color
In order to argue for the objective reality of color, Churchland provides himself
with a specic explanatory task:
How, it may be asked, does the peculiar and well-dened three-
dimensional structure of the human phenomenological color space. . .map
onto the objective space of possible electromagnetic reectance pro-
les displayed by material objects? What is the internal structure
of that objective target feature-domain in virtue of which the inter-
nal structure of our phenomenological color spindle constitutes an
accurate map of that target domain? ([Chu07], 123-4)
In providing such a mapping, Churchland focuses on one particular problem:
how can the diverse group of distinct reectance proles1 which appear subjec-
tively identical be characterized as a single kind in a non-circular fashion? The
naive strategy of characterizing red as just the equivalence class of reectance
proles which induce a sensation of red (for a normal subject in standard
viewing conditions, etc.) does not give Churchland the objectivity he desires. In
order to defend his conclusion, Churchland must dene the equivalence classes
of reectance proles correlated with phenomenological color space in a manner
which does not include reference to properties of the observer. In making this
argument, Churchland helps himself to the idea that the theory of metamers, or
classes of physically distinct spectral power distributions of light which match
onto the same point in phenomenological color space, can be recast in terms
of reectance proles. Pace Churchland, I will reserve the term metamer
1A surface reectance prole is a function which assigns a value (in the range 0-100) to
each possible wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. This number represents the percent
eciency with which the surface reects electromagnetic radiation at that wavelength.
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for lights with dierent spectral power distributions which appear subjectively
identical; I will use the term r-metamer to stand for dierent reectance proles
which appear subjectively identical under some specied lighting conditions. 2
Recognizing the diculties in specifying such lighting conditions, let us set that
issue aside and examine Churchland's solution to the problem of identifying the
appropriate r-metamers in a non-circular fashion.
Although his argument is far from rigorous, Churchland's intuitive account
is quite ingenious. First, consider only that region of an object's reectance
prole which encompasses the range of wavelengths visible to the human eye
(roughly, from 400 nm to 700 nm). Next, consider this section of the reectance
prole rolled into a cylinder; this turns the rectangular space of possible re-
ectance proles into a cylindrical space, with reective eciency values for
dierent wavelengths falling on the surface of the cylinder. Churchland claims
that any reectance prole will have a unique ellipse, induced by intersecting
the cylinder with a plane, which most closely approximates it. He proposes
to identify equivalence classes of r-metamers with classes of reectance proles
approximated by the same ellipse. In Churchland's words:
This trick turns the original reectance prole itself, whatever its
idiosyncratic ups and downs, into a wraparound conguration that
admits of an optimal approximation by a suitable planar cut through
the now-cylindrical space. . . The peculiar ellipse produced by a spe-
cic cut will be said to be an optimalor, as I shall say henceforth,
canonicalapproximation of the original or target reectance prole
when it meets the following two dening conditions:
1. The altitude of the ellipse must be such that the total area A
above the canonical ellipse, but below the several upper reaches of
the target reectance prole, is equal to the total area B beneath the
2Since the experiments which produced the modern theory of subjective color space, and
likewise of metamers, were performed with lights, I am worried that some diculties will arise
if we try to apply the theory of metamers mutatis mutandis to surface reectance proles. At
the very least, we need an account of standard lighting conditions to make this work because
the spectral power distribution of light entering the eye after bouncing o an object is a
function of that object's reectance prole and the spectral power distribution of the source
light.
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canonical ellipse, but above the several lower reaches of the target
reectance prole. (This condition guarantees that the total area
under the target reectance prole equals the total area under the
approximating ellipse.)
2. The angle by which the ellipse is tilted away from the horizontal
plane, and the rotational or compass heading positions of its upper
extreme, must be such as to minimize the magnitude of the two areas
A and B. This condition guarantees that the approximating ellipse
follows the gross shape of the target reectance prole, at least to
the degree possible. ([Chu07], 128)
The space of possible canonical approximation ellipses (CA-ellipses) can be
characterized by three dimensions of variance: 1) altitude of the CA-ellipse's
center; 2) degree of tilt from the horizontal; and 3) rotational position within
the cylinder. Churchland proposes to identify these three dimensions with the
three dimensions of the spindle shaped space of phenomenological color percep-
tion. Roughly, CA-ellipse altitude corresponds to brightness, tilt corresponds
to saturation, and rotational position corresponds to hue. Intuitively, the story
looks plausible, and the space of canonical reectance proles indeed looks quite
similar to that of phenomenological color perception. Churchland calls this sim-
ilarity the answer to a color realist's prayer ([Chu07], 133) and focuses in his
discussion primarily on objections concerning the slight metrical deformation of
the phenomenological color space with respect to the space of CA-ellipses under
the proposed mapping.
1.2 Critique of the Churchland account
Compelling though it may be, and setting aside the problem of standard lighting
conditions, Churchland's argument fails to exhibit sensitivity to the role of con-
text in color perception. The most obvious strategy for adapting Churchland's
argument involves reintroducing the subject into the characterization of viewing
conditions. The manner in which this would have to be done, however, would
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leave some objects with non-unique color assignments, drawing into question
the objectivity of such.
1.2.1 The context-sensitivity of color perception.
When performing experiments on color perception, the usual setup3 involves a
test light and three primary lights. The subject's visual eld is divided, with
the test light on one side and the primaries mixing on the other; the subject
manipulates the intensities of the primary lights until their mixture appears sub-
jectively identical to the test light. Symmetric matching experiments such as
this can be used to identify the class of metamers for a given subject. Demon-
strably, this class of metamers is invariant with respect to context, so long
as the context remains symmetric. In other words, suppose A and B are two
metameric spectral power distributions, ¯1 and ¯2 are two contexts (i.e. colored
environments within which the test lights occur), and ¯i (X) is the value in phe-
nomenological color space induced by spectral power distribution X in context
¯i. Then, since A and B are metamers, it will be the case that ¯1 (A) = ¯1 (B)
and ¯2 (A) = ¯2 (B), but it will not in general be the case that ¯1 (A) = ¯2 (B),
or vice versa (or even that ¯1 (A) = ¯2 (A)). The crucial point is that context
aects the phenomenological color value assigned to a particular spectral power
distribution.
For example, Jameson and Hurvich ([Jam59]) compare two equations for
describing the coding of spectral power distributions in three variables. One such
equation includes an additional factor (I, I', etc.) for capturing the inuence of
context on neural processing while the other does not. They remark:
It seems clear that so long as we are concerned only with the identity
or nonidentity of colors produced by stimuli of dierent wavelength
distributions for any of a series of dierent luminance levels, or for
3For a more detailed discussion see [Wan95], 80.
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any of a series of symmetrical adaptation and surround conditions,
there is no way of discriminating between the alternative equations,
and the introduction in these relations of the expression I or I' to
express the induced neural activity remains arbitrary.
If, on the other hand, we are also interested in the subjective ap-
pearance of the color C, then the alternative relations are by no
means equivalent, and the disparity between them will depend on
the contribution of the induced response (I or I' ) relative to the
total response. Moreover, when we come to compare color percep-
tions, color matches, or psychophysical functions for dierent, or
nonsymmetrical conditions of adaptation and/or contrast, we nd
that the expression I (or I' ) is no longer a matter of indierence
to the result, and its importance can be subjected to an empirical
check. ([Jam59], 892)
A similar point is made by Suppes, et al. ([Sup89]):
We have emphasized that in a metameric color match a » b, the
lights a, b are viewed under identical conditions. If the viewing
conditions change, the appearance of the metameric match may
change drastically though it remains a match. It follows that asym-
metry of the viewing conditions often produces a color mismatch
between metameric or, for that matter, isomeric (identical) distribu-
tions. In fact, the perceptual eect of viewing conditions is demon-
strated. . . by showing that physically identical lights no longer match
in color. ([Sup89], 252)
So, the subjective appearance of a colored light depends on the context, or the
spectral power distribution of nearby colored light. Now, since Churchland has
taken the theory of metamers for spectral power distributions of light and ap-
plied it, mutatis mutandis, to surface reectance properties of objects, it seems
fair to bring along as well this context sensitivity for subjective color asses-
ments. In other words, even if we presume some standard lighting conditions,
stipulated in terms of broad daylight, say, the same reectance prole will
produce dierent subjective color assessments depending upon the reectance
prole of nearby surfaces. In fact, this is empirically the case as we can see
from the Munker illusion, the watercolor illusion, and the neon color spreading
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illusion, to name just a few.4
Of course, color illusions involving reectance properties of surfaces usually
involve distinct surface reectance proles occurring in very close proximity. The
realist may therefore attempt to argue that such contextual eects are purely
local, i.e. occur only when the two surfaces subtend a suciently small angle
in the visual eld. One could therefore avoid the phenomenon by stating that
the (homogenous) surface in question must subtend some substantially large
angle in the visual eld. No matter how recalcitrant, any contextually induced
eects on subjective color assesment should disappear if the contextual factors
are removed to a sucient distance from the focal viewing area. Nevertheless, if
one adds such a specication to the requirements of standard viewing conditions,
one reintroduces the subject into the equation. In other words, one can only
specify the visual angle the stimulus will occupy in terms of the subject's position
with respect to the stimulus, thus her distance from the stimulus will become
a factor in the characterization of standard viewing conditions. At rst blush,
introducing such a x to the context sensitivity problem removes the objectivity
of the characterization of reectance proles.
There is a further wrinkle, however: the assumption that we can x the
standard viewing conditions by specifying the subject's position with respect to
the stimulus depends upon the homogeneity of surface reectance properties.
Yet, such surface properties are not in general homogenous. A consequence is
that some objects will t the standard viewing conditions multiple ways, and
will thus be multiple colors simultaneously. Consider, for example, a cloth of
nely woven blue and yellow threads. If viewed from a very close distance, such
that individual threads subtend a large enough angle of visual space to conform
to the standard viewing conditions, the object will be striped blue and yellow. If
4Each of these illusions involves creating the appearance that two patches of surface with
the exact same reectance prole are dierent colors by giving the surfaces surrounding
them dramatically dierent reectance proles.
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viewed from a further distance, however, such that the cloth as a whole subtends
the appropriate angle, then it will be a homogenous shade of green. Depending,
in other words, on the size of the patch of heterogenous surface one chooses to
average over, the spectral reectance prole, and thus the objective color, may
be signicantly dierent.
1.2.2 The inferential character of color perception
Ironically, it is the context-sensitivity of color vision which produces our sub-
jective sense of color constancy. It is only because [c]olor appearance depends
more on the local contrast of the cone absorptions than on the absolute level
of cone absorptions ([Wan95], 289) that an object (say, an apple) will appear
the same color in vastly dierent viewing conditions (say, high noon and twi-
light). Since Helmholtz, many vision scientists have found it useful to interpret
the computations of the visual system which result in judgments such as color
constancy as inferential in character. Although the process by which conclu-
sions about color are derived is unconscious, and thus may be qualitatively
dierent from that of conscious inferences, the epistemological status of these
unconscious conclusions is the same.
[W]hile it is true that there has been, and probably always will be,
a measure of doubt as to the similarity of the psychic activity in
the two cases, there can be no doubt as to the similarity between
the results of such unconscious conclusions and those of conscious
conclusions. These unconscious conclusions derived from sensation
are equivalent in their consequences to the so-called conclusions from
analogy. ([Hel66], 174)
If we accept (as many perceptual scientists do) Helmholtz's analysis, then phe-
nomenological color space is a kind of theory about the world. The problem of
determining the reality of colors, then, may be analogous to the problem of de-
termining the reality of scientic theories. In particular, even the most robust
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scientic theories (say, Newton's gravitational theory) bear only a statistical
relationship to the data which support them, leaving perpetually open the pos-
sibility that a better theory may come along and prove them false. Likewise,
color judgments bear only a statistical relationship to surface reectance prop-
erties. The realist strategy is to eliminate the probabilistic character of this
relationship by specifying standard viewing conditions. As discussed above,
however, there may exist objects for which even the best notion of standard
viewing conditions makes no sense.
Perhaps it would be useful here to consider an analogy with a perceptual
domain which is commonly taken to be objective, size. Size judgments exhibit
the same context sensitivity as color judgments for precisely the same purpose,
namely to induce a constancy over perceptions of size. The eects of context on
size judgment can easily be seen in the Ames room illusion. Consider another
optical illusion, however, the changing size of the moon. Subjectively, the moon
appears signicantly larger when it is close to the horizon; yet the moon al-
ways subtends the same angle of visual space, as its distance from any observer
remains (approximately) constant. Something about the contextual cues when
the moon is close to the horizon induces the visual system to infer that the moon
is larger than it infers it to be when it is higher in the sky (although several
explanations for the phenomenon have been proposed, there is no consensus on
the correct explanation). Now, since it is quite easy to operationalize our notion
of size in a manner that is invariant with respect to viewing conditions (say, by
measuring with a ruler), we have an objective notion of the size of the moon.
But suppose we had no recourse but to specify the size of the moon with respect
to standard viewing conditions; what would the standard viewing conditions be
such that we could make an appropriate judgment about the size of the moon?
The problem here is that any of the candidates for standard viewing conditions
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which might work for everyday objects (middle sized dry goods, etc.) cannot
be adapted to viewing conditions for planetary bodies; planets are simply too
big for the perceptual system's techniques for inferring size to apply.
Returning to color, I can now state the problem for Churchland more suc-
cinctly: so long as the only test available for the objective partition of the
space of surface reectance properties is that it matches phenomenological color
space, the very properties of color perception which produce color constancy
for everyday objects like oranges and apples will defeat the uniqueness of color
values for atypical objects. Yet, if color is objective, then these atypical objects
should have unique, determinate colors associated with them.
2 Minimal Naturalistic Semantics for Represen-
tational Content
As Wagner and Warner have noted, eliminativists and proponents of folk the-
ory tend to communicate through short dismissals of each other's positions
(13). Likewise, it is tempting for those of us who reject naturalism in its robust
metaphysical form to dismiss Churchland's program on the basis simply of his
reductivist and (naive?) realist conclusions. However, the research program
proposed by Churchland should be of interest to any philosopher who counte-
nances a notion of representational content and respects the methodology and
results of the sciences. If we reinterpret Churchland's program in this light, re-
jecting strong reductivist conclusions in favor of a more tempered, or minimal,
reading, we can appreciate its explanatory value for any developed philosophical
account of representational content.
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2.1 A program for naturalizing representational content
Model theoretic semantics assigns primitive terms and predicates meaning by
providing them an interpretation in a set-theoretical structure. Can we make
sense of an analogous project for non-linguistic domains such as, say, the space
of percepts for a given sense modality? Since perceptions can vary continuously
with respect to certain features (e.g. sourness, heat, loudness, redness,
etc.), an account of the meaning of these perceptual qualia might, analogously,
be given via an interpretation of the axes which dene the space of variation
with respect to the axes of variation of some model (potentially, though not
necessarily, characterized in set theoretic terms). If, furthermore, the model
of a given perceptual space is a structure external to the brain and well dened
by natural science, we might claim to have provided a naturalistic semantics
for the perceptual space. Churchland motivates a project along these lines
with a Just-So story about the evolutionary development of contentful cognitive
structures:
A promising general approach to understanding how the brainor
any of its various subsystemsrepresents the external world posits
the brain's development, through learning, of a variety of (often high-
dimensional) maps of the objective similarity-structure of this, that,
or the other objective feature-domain. Through extended experience
with the relevant objective feature-domain, the relevant part of the
brain can construct an internal map of that domainof the range
of possible faces, the range of possible voices, the range of possible
reaching options, the range of possible colors, and so forth. ([Chu07],
121)
This account suggests a bipartite program for providing a naturalistic semantics
for representational mental states. One goal is to provide a mapping between
a cognitive representational space (such as, say, the phenomenological color
space) and some well dened domain of variance in the environment (whether it
be surface reectance proles, spectral power distributions, or what have you).
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The second goal is to provide a detailed causal story for how such a mapping is
induced; such a causal story will, necessarily, incorporate the causal structure
of the perceptual system's inferential computations.
Churchland only explicitly acknowledges the rst of these goals, claiming
that by providing a mapping between cognitive domain and external feature
domain, one has provided a semantics for the cognitive domain.
Such homomorphisms or second-order resemblances, on this view,
are the essence of the brain's representational achievements. One
might call this account domain-portrayal semantics, to contrast it
with such familiar doctrines as indicator semantics or causal covari-
ation semantics. ([Chu07], 123)5
However, he seems to explicitly acknowledge the importance of the second goal
when refering to the nature and ground of our internal map ([Chu07], 125).
If I interpret him correctly here, by nature he means the well developed (ax-
iomatizable, etc.) theory of phenomenological color space, and by ground he
means the physiological story about how this space is neurally coded (partially
understood, though many questions remain concerning the exact connection
between the physiological and the phenomenological here).
Churchland himself has attempted to engage in the second goal in [Chu05],
where he argues for a correspondence between idealized models of the neural
wiring for opponent color vision (as oered in, for example, [Hur81], Ch. 11) and
phenomenological color space. Yet neural network models such as Churchland
considers (those in which the three types of cone cells are wired into three types
of opponent color cells: red-green, blue-yellow, and white-black) are hand-tuned,
as it were, to correspond to the phenomenological color spindle. A perhaps more
critical step for the program outlined here is a detailed account of the relation-
ship between such idealized models of neural wiring and the actual wiring of the
visual system as discovered via experimentation. For example, Derrington, et
5c.f. [Gar00], which presents a similar idea in terms of conceptual spaces
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al. ([Der84]) found neurons in the macaque LGN which respond as if receiving
a red-green opponent color signal yet which do not meet the specication of
the canonical R-G opponent cell (264). As Wandell discusses:
The spectral responses of these neural populations suggest that there
is only a loose connection between the signals coded by the neu-
rons and the perceptual coding into opponent hues; it is unlikely
that excitation and inhibition causes our perception of red-green and
blue-yellow as opponent colors. One diculty is the imperfect cor-
respondence between the neural responses and the hue-cancellation
measurements. The second diculty is that there is no substantial
population of neurons representing a white-black signal. This is a
very important perceptual dimension which must be carried in the
signals of the LGN. Yet, no clearly identied group of neurons can
be assigned this role. ([Wan95], 324)
2.2 The role of reductions
Churchland concludes [Chu05] with some remarks on the import of the reduc-
tion he has provided:
[T]he principal intellectual motive for embracing the systematic iden-
tities between color qualia and coding vectors proposed is simply the
extent and quality of the predictive and explanatory unity that the
relevant reduction provides. ([Chu05], 554)
I hope the above discussion has demonstrated, however, that we are still far from
providing a detailed enough account of the relationship between phenomenolog-
ical color space and reectance properties (or even between idealized neural
network models and empirical measurements of neural activity) for there to be
any serious candidate for a reduction of color qualia on the table. In fact, if
such a reduction is ultimately provided, it may be so convoluted and qualied
that our intuitions concerning its ontological import could well be defeated.
Controversies arise when claims about reduction are ideological rather
than scientic in character. It is not usually appreciated how in-
volved and technical the actual reduction of one part of scienceeven
a near neighboris to another. ([Sup02], 52)
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These general considerations aside, if we do manage to succeed in providing a
convincing naturalistic semantics for a particular perceptual domain along the
lines outlined above, will we have then provided a reduction of that domain?
Here is precisely where the non-naturalist's eyes begin to glaze over, her
resistance to reduction in any form will make her skeptical of the entire project.
Yet, the strategy for providing naturalistic semantics outlined above is minimal
in just this sense: it is neutral with respect to the ontological import of such an
account. Consider, for example, Mary's question, namely: will the complete
scientic account of color vision tell one (ideally one who has never seen it) what
it's like to experience the color red? To oversimplify, here, briey, are three
potential answers:
1. [metaphysical naturalist ] Yes, because we have reduced color
qualia to X (= reectance properties, whatever)
2. [methodological naturalist ] No, because the question is ill-posed;
science is not in the business of explaining what subjective experi-
ences are like. Insofar as the question can be recast in operational
terms, then yes.
3. [non-naturalist ] No, there will always be an additional phe-
nomenon (the qualia) in need of (philosophical) investigation, which
cannot be explained via the scientic account.
Yet, as stated above, the project for providing a naturalistic semantics for color
is neutral between these answers. Even if it succeeds as an account of meaning
for color percepts, the implications of this semantics for ontological questions,
or questions of explanatory power, will remain open. In fact, even the non-
naturalist should benet from such a proposed semantics: surely one can better
critique the view that color qualia can be reduced to physical phenomena if one
is informed by the exact proposal? As we've seen in the quote from Wandell
which concludes the previous section, ammunition for the anti-reductive view
may come from science itself.
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A minimal naturalistic semantics will provide the best available candidate
for a reduction of any perceptual domain to physical phenomena, yet an argu-
ment that such a reduction has been provided will be needed in addition to the
minimal account. Furthermore, even philosophers resolutely opposed to reduc-
tive programs may benet from such an account. Finally, the resolute naturalist
himself would do well to clearly distinguish between those aspects of his argu-
ment which carry ontological weight and those of a more minimal character, the
better to communicate with those whose too hasty dismissals depend upon the
former and blind them to the general value of the latter.
3 Future Prospects for Naturalistic Semantics
Color is uniquely suited to the research program discussed above. This is be-
cause psychology has provided us with a robust and detailed theory of phe-
nomenological color space, physics has provided us with a detailed theory of
the properties of light, and neurophysiology has uncovered many of the neural
mechanisms for coding color information. Ironically, on all three accounts, sci-
entic theories pertinent to color are far better developed than those for many
primary properties such as shape. Scientic theories of the phenomenological
space of space perception, for example, are woefully underdeveloped, and theo-
ries of the neural substrate of shape perception are similarly poor. Contrary to
a priori analysis, then, it looks as if a naturalistic account of phenomenological
color space may actually be much easier to provide than one of phenomenolog-
ical shape space (and, a fortiori, the corresponding spaces of middle-sized dry
goods or linguistic abstracta). Given that these domains are much more complex
than that of color, we may expect a fully detailed naturalistic semantics to be
that much more dicult to develop, potentially encountering problems far more
intricate than those posed by the context sensitivity and inferential character of
15
color perception. Perhaps, then, rather than struggling to defend realism about
colors, the naturalistic semanticist may wish to question realist assumptions
about the objects of everyday experience. For it is by applying lessons learned
in simple domains to progressively more complex ones that science proceeds,
and so also with the cautious naturalist.
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